![]() ![]() Feit sets out and defends a detailed account of plural harm, addressing issues about the magnitude and the time of the harm suffered by the victim. These harmful events are bad things, collectively, even if no single event is itself a bad thing. He argues that an adequate theory of harm should entail the counterfactual comparative account but also make room for a certain kind plural harm, where two or more events together harm an individual although neither one by itself is harmful. Feit provides detailed and thorough responses to the most challenging objections. ![]() The counterfactual comparative account is widely accepted but also widely criticized. On this account, in its most basic form, an act or event harms an individual provided that she would have been better off if it had not occurred. The most basic question is this: under what conditions does an event harm a given individual? Neil Feit focuses primarily on the metaphysics of harm, and he both defends and extends the counterfactual comparative account of harm. ![]() Bad Things addresses various philosophical questions about the nature and moral relevance of harm. ![]()
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